Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.003zbMath1417.91203OpenAlexW2129730513WikidataQ129159400 ScholiaQ129159400MaRDI QIDQ1622464

Rosario Macera

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

loss aversiondynamic moral hazardexpectation-based reference-dependent preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (2)

English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders ⋮ Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders

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