Limit game models for climate change negotiations

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-70619-1_2zbMath1417.91069OpenAlexW2786881737MaRDI QIDQ1622586

Olivier Bahn, Roland P. Malhamé, Alain B. Haurie

Publication date: 19 November 2018

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70619-1_2

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamemean field gamesclimate change negotiations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)

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