To bail-out or to bail-in? Answers from an agent-based model

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2014.08.020zbMath1402.91955arXiv1403.1548OpenAlexW2080110320MaRDI QIDQ1623970

J. Doyne Farmer, Sebastian Poledna, Stefan Thurner, Peter Klimek

Publication date: 15 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.1548

zbMATH Keywords

agent-based modelbail-inbail-outcrisis resolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Financial applications of other theories (91G80) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items (6)

Elimination of systemic risk in financial networks by means of a systemic risk transaction tax ⋮ Basel III capital surcharges for G-SIBs are far less effective in managing systemic risk in comparison to network-based, systemic risk-dependent financial transaction taxes ⋮ Winter is possibly not coming: mitigating financial instability in an agent-based model with interbank market ⋮ Quantifying the concerns of Dimon and Buffett with data and computation ⋮ CONTAGION IN HETEROGENEOUS FINANCIAL NETWORKS ⋮ The impacts of interest rates on banks' loan portfolio risk-taking

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• Elimination of systemic risk in financial networks by means of a systemic risk transaction tax
• Network topology of the interbank market
• Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1

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