Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2018.06.007zbMath1402.91370OpenAlexW2755092608MaRDI QIDQ1624474

Alexander K. Karaivanov, Fernando M. Martin

Publication date: 16 November 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2011/2011-030.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardlimited commitmentrisk-sharingMarkov-perfect equilibriumconsumption smoothing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62) Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium theory (91B51)

Cites Work

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• Dynamic Financial Constraints: Distinguishing Mechanism Design From Exogenously Incomplete Regimes
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions

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