Markov-perfect risk sharing, moral hazard and limited commitment
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Publication:1624474
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2018.06.007zbMath1402.91370OpenAlexW2755092608MaRDI QIDQ1624474
Alexander K. Karaivanov, Fernando M. Martin
Publication date: 16 November 2018
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2011/2011-030.pdf
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