The roll call interpretation of the Shapley value

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.09.025zbMath1402.91023arXiv1808.02696OpenAlexW2887453295MaRDI QIDQ1627000

Stefan Napel, Sascha Kurz

Publication date: 22 November 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.02696

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueShapley-Shubik indexvoting powerroll call model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (1)

Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output

Cites Work

• An asymmetric Shapley-Shubik power index
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