Tight inefficiency bounds for perception-parameterized affine congestion games

DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2018.04.025zbMath1411.91142OpenAlexW2802952317WikidataQ129972390 ScholiaQ129972390MaRDI QIDQ1628591

Guido Schäfer, Pieter Kleer

Publication date: 4 December 2018

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/27659

zbMATH Keywords

congestion gamesprice of anarchyprice of stabilityinefficiency of equilibriaaltruistic gamesrisk-averse playersuniversal taxes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (1)

Price of anarchy for parallel link networks with generalized mean objective

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games
• Congestion games with linearly independent paths: convergence time and price of anarchy
• Potential games
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Efficiency of Restricted Tolls in Non-atomic Network Routing Games
• Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy
• Taxes for linear atomic congestion games
• The Curse of Sequentiality in Routing Games
• Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players
• The price of anarchy of finite congestion games

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