Global mutations and local mutations have very different effects on evolution, illustrated by mixed strategies of asymmetric binary games

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2009.09.025zbMath1403.91047OpenAlexW1975500918WikidataQ57065278 ScholiaQ57065278MaRDI QIDQ1629004

Yoh Iwasa, Takashi Uehara

Publication date: 11 December 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.09.025

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsevolutionary gameselection-mutation valance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) 2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

The average abundance function with mutation of the multi-player snowdrift evolutionary game model ⋮ An analysis of the replicator dynamics for an asymmetric hawk-dove game

Cites Work

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• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity in \(n\)-person games
• Stability by mutation in evolutionary games
• Variant evolutionary trees under phenotypic variance
• Stable Polymorphisms in a Selection Model with Mutation
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

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