Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.08.014zbMath1406.91185OpenAlexW2886239869WikidataQ129358841 ScholiaQ129358841MaRDI QIDQ1629617

Yizhaq Minchuk

Publication date: 12 December 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.014

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionsreimbursement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Manipulation of moves in sequential contests ⋮ Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information ⋮ Contests with insurance ⋮ Winner's optimal reimbursement in contest ⋮ Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement

Cites Work

• Sad-loser contests
• Contests with rank-order spillovers
• Cost sharing under increasing returns: A comparison of simple mechanisms
• Manipulations in contests
• Contest architecture

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