Cooperation and strategic complementarity: an experiment with two voluntary contribution mechanism games with interior equilibria
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Publication:1630455
DOI10.3390/G9030045zbMath1418.91135OpenAlexW2863443155WikidataQ129490368 ScholiaQ129490368MaRDI QIDQ1630455
Publication date: 10 December 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030045
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