On the stability of couples

DOI10.3390/g9030048zbMath1418.91044OpenAlexW2874520070MaRDI QIDQ1630461

Tobias Hiller

Publication date: 10 December 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030048

zbMATH Keywords

team gamesmarriage market\(\chi\)-valuestability of couples

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

Measuring players' importance in basketball using the generalized Shapley value ⋮ Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Assortativity evolving from social dilemmas
• Rankings and values for team games
• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
• On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
• Evolutionary games and matching rules
• Quantitative overeducation and cooperative game theory
• Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
• On a characterization of stable matchings
• A competitive partnership formation process
• The \(\chi\) value and team games
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: On the stability of couples