On the stability of couples
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Publication:1630461
DOI10.3390/g9030048zbMath1418.91044OpenAlexW2874520070MaRDI QIDQ1630461
Publication date: 10 December 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030048
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Measuring players' importance in basketball using the generalized Shapley value ⋮ Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures
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