Voluntary leadership and asymmetric endowments in the investment game
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1630469
DOI10.3390/G9030051zbMath1418.91134OpenAlexW2884921851WikidataQ129412313 ScholiaQ129412313MaRDI QIDQ1630469
Fabian Kleine, Manfred Königstein, Balázs Rozsnyói
Publication date: 10 December 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030051
Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations
- To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets
- Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence
- How to identify trust and reciprocity.
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- Trust, reciprocity, and social history
- Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence
- A theory of reciprocity
- Playing Cournot although they shouldn't: endogenous timing in experimental duopolies with asymmetric cost
- A Truth Serum for Non-Bayesians: Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Risk Attitudes
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
- Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
This page was built for publication: Voluntary leadership and asymmetric endowments in the investment game
