Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game

DOI10.3390/G9030054zbMath1418.91123OpenAlexW2885257928MaRDI QIDQ1630474

Felix Albrecht, Sebastian Kube

Publication date: 10 December 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030054

zbMATH Keywords

strategy methodpublic goods gamecoordination gamepeer punishmenttype classificationweakest link game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• hroot

Cites Work

• Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations
• Conditional punishment
• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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