Security from the adversary's inertia-controlling convergence speed when playing mixed strategy equilibria

DOI10.3390/g9030059zbMath1418.91035OpenAlexW2888657370WikidataQ129362670 ScholiaQ129362670MaRDI QIDQ1630490

Sandra König, Jasmin Wachter, Stefan Rass

Publication date: 10 December 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030059

zbMATH Keywords

game theorystochastic controlincomplete informationbounded rationalityswitching costsPerron-Frobeniusmixed strategy equilibriuminformation delaycontrol of expenses

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (1)

Computing mixed strategies equilibria in presence of switching costs by the solution of nonconvex QP problems

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• \texttt{FlipIt}: the game of ``stealthy takeover
• Convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games
• Geometric bounds for eigenvalues of Markov chains
• On the cost of game playing: how to control the expenses in mixed strategies
• Game-Theoretic Approach to Feedback-Driven Multi-stage Moving Target Defense
• Convergence time to Nash equilibrium in load balancing
• Adversarial Risk Analysis

This page was built for publication: Security from the adversary's inertia-controlling convergence speed when playing mixed strategy equilibria