Coordination and private information revelation

DOI10.3390/g9030064zbMath1418.91094OpenAlexW2891849603MaRDI QIDQ1630500

Debdatta Saha, Prabal Roy Chowdhury

Publication date: 10 December 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030064

zbMATH Keywords

coordinationstrategic uncertaintyprivate information revelation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Strategic Information Revelation
• Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure