Instrumental reciprocity as an error

DOI10.3390/G9030066zbMath1418.91138OpenAlexW2890785496MaRDI QIDQ1630504

Ernesto Reuben, Sigrid Suetens

Publication date: 10 December 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030066

zbMATH Keywords

experimentreciprocation of cooperationrepeated sequential prisoners' dilemma games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Infinity in the lab. How do people play repeated games?
• Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: an experimental study
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart
• Linear public goods experiments: a meta-analysis
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players
• Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma*
• Quantal Response Equilibrium

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