Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2010.03.002zbMath1403.91034OpenAlexW1990336455WikidataQ39892311 ScholiaQ39892311MaRDI QIDQ1630863

Yasuo Ihara, Shun Kurokawa, Joe Yuichiro Wakano

Publication date: 5 December 2018

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2010.03.002

zbMATH Keywords

mathematical modelcooperationprisoner's dilemmafinite populationsfixation probabilitypublic goods gamesgenerosityone-third law

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Public goods (91B18) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites Work

• Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
• Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
• The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
• The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
• Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
• The Evolution of Cooperation

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