Strategic conversations under imperfect information: epistemic message exchange games

DOI10.1007/s10849-018-9271-9zbMath1427.03045OpenAlexW2806084788MaRDI QIDQ1630949

Soumya Paul, Nicholas M. Asher

Publication date: 5 December 2018

Published in: Journal of Logic, Language and Information (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://oatao.univ-toulouse.fr/22178/1/asher_22178.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

discourse representation theoryepistemic game theorystrategic conversations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Logic of natural languages (03B65) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Cites Work

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• Language Games
• Switching Costs and the Gittins Index
• Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems
• Prediction, Learning, and Games
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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