Robust pooling for contracting models with asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2018.08.041zbMath1403.91151OpenAlexW2889419324WikidataQ129311769 ScholiaQ129311769MaRDI QIDQ1631526

R. B. O. Kerkkamp, Wilco van den Heuvel, Albert P. M. Wagelmans

Publication date: 6 December 2018

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repub.eur.nl/pub/100165

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryasymmetric informationmechanism designoptimal partitioningpooling of contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)

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