Targeting the key player: an incentive-based approach

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.10.001zbMath1418.91099OpenAlexW3123037036WikidataQ129030705 ScholiaQ129030705MaRDI QIDQ1633660

Frédéric Deroïan, Mohamed Belhaj

Publication date: 20 December 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01981885/file/BD-JME%202018.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

networkincentivescontractlinear interactionkey playerlimited budget

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (2)

The limit of targeting in networks ⋮ Targeting in networks under costly agreements

Cites Work

• Network security and contagion
• Key leaders in social networks
• Optimal targeting strategies in a network under complementarities
• Network design and defence
• Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player
• How to Organize Crime¹
• How do you defend a network?
• Key Player Policies When Contextual Effects Matter

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