Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.05.003zbMath1418.91296OpenAlexW2805153191MaRDI QIDQ1633663

I. Arribas, Amparo Urbano

Publication date: 20 December 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.05.003

zbMATH Keywords

strong Nash equilibriumsubgame perfect Nash equilibriummultiproduct tradingpackage assignment problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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