Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1633670
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.04.001zbMath1418.91388OpenAlexW3123463491WikidataQ129965555 ScholiaQ129965555MaRDI QIDQ1633670
Publication date: 20 December 2018
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.04.001
consistencynon-bossinessaffirmative actionresource-monotonicityfavoring-higher-ranksimmediate acceptance mechanism
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (11)
The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks ⋮ When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? ⋮ School choice with preference rank classes ⋮ Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices ⋮ Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ On Capacity-Filling and Substitutable Choice Rules ⋮ How lotteries in school choice help to level the playing field ⋮ Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem ⋮ Influence in private-goods allocation ⋮ Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
Cites Work
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
- Non-bossiness
- Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Affirmative actions: the Boston mechanism case
- On cores and indivisibility
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
- General theory of best variants choice: Some aspects
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
This page was built for publication: Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
