Incorporating monitoring technology and on-site inspections into an \(n\)-person inspection game
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Publication:1634304
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2018.10.012zbMath1404.91023OpenAlexW2895840453MaRDI QIDQ1634304
Yael Perlman, Noam Goldberg, Yael Deutsch
Publication date: 18 December 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2018.10.012
(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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