Allocating group housing

DOI10.1007/s00355-017-1097-xzbMath1391.91128OpenAlexW2769676037MaRDI QIDQ1638025

Justin Burkett, Francis X. Flanagan, Amanda L. Griffith

Publication date: 12 June 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1097-x

zbMATH Keywords

roommates problemgroup housing allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Matching with partners and projects

Cites Work

• The core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples
• Geometric stable roommates
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• House allocation with existing tenants
• Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
• On cores and indivisibility
• The roommates problem revisited
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates
• Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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