Efficient extensions of communication values

DOI10.1007/S10479-017-2661-6zbMath1391.91014OpenAlexW2107736781MaRDI QIDQ1639272

Frank Huettner, Sylvain Béal, André Casajus

Publication date: 12 June 2018

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2015-04.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Myerson valueposition valueaverage tree solutionrelative fairnessefficient extensionbalanced link contributionscompensation solutioncomponent fairnesscomponent-wise egalitarian solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (6)

Efficient quotient extensions of the Myerson value ⋮ The efficient partition surplus Owen graph value ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Efficient extensions of the Myerson value based on endogenous claims from players ⋮ A value for communication situations with players having different bargaining abilities ⋮ The efficient proportional Myerson values

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