Efficient extensions of communication values
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Publication:1639272
DOI10.1007/S10479-017-2661-6zbMath1391.91014OpenAlexW2107736781MaRDI QIDQ1639272
Frank Huettner, Sylvain Béal, André Casajus
Publication date: 12 June 2018
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2015-04.pdf
Myerson valueposition valueaverage tree solutionrelative fairnessefficient extensionbalanced link contributionscompensation solutioncomponent fairnesscomponent-wise egalitarian solution
Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Related Items (6)
Efficient quotient extensions of the Myerson value ⋮ The efficient partition surplus Owen graph value ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Efficient extensions of the Myerson value based on endogenous claims from players ⋮ A value for communication situations with players having different bargaining abilities ⋮ The efficient proportional Myerson values
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