Linear quadratic game of exploitation of common renewable resources with inherent constraints
DOI10.12775/TMNA.2017.057zbMath1391.91053OpenAlexW2786104331WikidataQ112313926 ScholiaQ112313926MaRDI QIDQ1639916
Rajani Singh, Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
Publication date: 13 June 2018
Published in: Topological Methods in Nonlinear Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.tmna/1516330915
Bellman equationNash equilibriumsocial optimalitycommon renewable resourceslinear quadratic dynamic games with constraintsPigouvian taxation
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)
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Cites Work
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