Real options signaling game models for dynamic acquisition under information asymmetry

DOI10.1007/S10203-018-0206-3zbMath1391.91160OpenAlexW3125521167MaRDI QIDQ1640174

Chi Man Leung, Yue Kuen Kwok

Publication date: 13 June 2018

Published in: Decisions in Economics and Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-018-0206-3

zbMATH Keywords

decision analysisperfect Bayesian equilibriuminformation asymmetrydynamic acquisitionreal options signaling game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Related Items (1)

REAL OPTION SIGNALING GAMES OF DEBT FINANCING USING EQUITY GUARANTEE SWAPS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Cites Work

• Optimal and strategic timing of mergers and acquisitions motivated by synergies and risk diversification

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