Simulating cardinal preferences in Boolean games: a proof technique

DOI10.1016/j.ic.2017.09.008zbMath1395.68256OpenAlexW2795410054MaRDI QIDQ1641024

Egor Ianovski, Luke Ong

Publication date: 14 June 2018

Published in: Information and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:48f08657-4077-4cd9-b6af-8b86ab6ab771

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)

Related Items (1)

Behavioural strategies in weighted Boolean games

Cites Work

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