Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
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Publication:1642157
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.01.004zbMath1393.91093OpenAlexW2790599363WikidataQ125799783 ScholiaQ125799783MaRDI QIDQ1642157
Publication date: 20 June 2018
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.01.004
Applications of graph theory (05C90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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