Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.03.007zbMath1393.91124OpenAlexW2795353283WikidataQ130060031 ScholiaQ130060031MaRDI QIDQ1642176

Kyohei Marutani

Publication date: 20 June 2018

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.03.007

zbMATH Keywords

acyclicityschool choicepriority structurePareto efficient assigment rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Constrained school choice
• Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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