Sequential interactions -- in which one player plays first and another responds -- promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.05.007zbMath1397.92502OpenAlexW2803581398WikidataQ88679701 ScholiaQ88679701MaRDI QIDQ1642640

Robert A. Laird

Publication date: 15 June 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.05.007

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryspatial modelssimultaneous gamesalternating gamesindirect invasions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Sequential interactions -- in which one player plays first and another responds -- promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games ⋮ laird-jtb2018

Cites Work

• Sequential interactions -- in which one player plays first and another responds -- promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games
• Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations: prisoner's dilemma vs. snowdrift games
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• Competitive intransitivity, population interaction structure, and strategy coexistence
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• A theory of reciprocity
• Direct reciprocity in structured populations
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Cooperation in two-dimensional mixed-games
• THE SPATIAL DILEMMAS OF EVOLUTION
• The Calculus of Selfishness
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