State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing

DOI10.1007/S10100-016-0461-8zbMath1390.91318OpenAlexW2228274439MaRDI QIDQ1642789

Anita Lovas, Edina Berlinger, Péter L. Juhász

Publication date: 15 June 2018

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://unipub.lib.uni-corvinus.hu/2185/

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcontract theoryexternalitiescrowding out

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Related Items (2)

State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing ⋮ Editorial

Cites Work

• Corporate financing under moral hazard and the default risk of buyers
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• State subsidy and moral hazard in corporate financing
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt

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