When do utilitarianism and egalitarianism agree on evaluation? An intersection approach
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Publication:1645206
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.05.002zbMath1395.91168OpenAlexW2804166861WikidataQ129771356 ScholiaQ129771356MaRDI QIDQ1645206
Publication date: 28 June 2018
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.05.002
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Cites Work
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