Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
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Publication:1647508
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2018.02.001zbMath1451.91054OpenAlexW2791957390MaRDI QIDQ1647508
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Bo An, Yue Yin, Noam Hazon
Publication date: 26 June 2018
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2018.02.001
Mixed integer programming (90C11) Linear programming (90C05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)
Related Items (5)
A study of general and security Stackelberg game formulations ⋮ Computational complexity characterization of protecting elections from bribery ⋮ Protecting elections by recounting ballots ⋮ Exploiting social influence to control elections based on positional scoring rules ⋮ Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games
Uses Software
Cites Work
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