Masking proofs are tight and how to exploit it in security evaluations
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Publication:1648843
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-78375-8_13zbMath1428.94075OpenAlexW2592002982WikidataQ58764858 ScholiaQ58764858MaRDI QIDQ1648843
François-Xavier Standaert, Vincent Grosso
Publication date: 9 July 2018
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78375-8_13
Related Items (7)
On the worst-case side-channel security of ECC point randomization in embedded devices ⋮ Effective and efficient masking with low noise using small-Mersenne-prime ciphers ⋮ Systematic study of decryption and re-encryption leakage: the case of Kyber ⋮ Prouff and Rivain's formal security proof of masking, revisited. Tight bounds in the noisy leakage model ⋮ Packed multiplication: how to amortize the cost of side-channel masking? ⋮ Vectorizing Higher-Order Masking ⋮ Making masking security proofs concrete (or how to evaluate the security of any leaking device), extended version
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