Timing effect in bargaining and ex ante efficiency of the relative utilitarian solution

DOI10.1007/s11238-017-9640-xzbMath1397.91241OpenAlexW2620405788MaRDI QIDQ1648915

Omer F. Baris

Publication date: 5 July 2018

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-017-9640-x

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingrelative utilitarianismtiming effectweak linearity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Egalitarian-utilitarian bounds in Nash's bargaining problem
• Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions
• Twofold optimality of the relative utilitarian bargaining solution
• Altenative characterizations of three bargaining solution for nonconvex problems
• The Nash solution is more utilitarian than egalitarian
• The equal-loss principle for bargaining problems
• Non-existence of super-additive solutions for 3-person games
• An impossibility result concerning \(n\)-person bargaining games
• Bargaining in economic and ethical environments. An experimental study and normative solution concepts
• Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
• Extended Pareto rules and relative utilitarianism
• On the superlinear bargaining solution
• The Bargaining Problem
• Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Impartiality: Definition and Representation
• Relative Utilitarianism
• A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems
• Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism

This page was built for publication: Timing effect in bargaining and ex ante efficiency of the relative utilitarian solution