Approval mechanism to solve prisoner's dilemma: comparison with Varian's compensation mechanism

DOI10.1007/S00355-017-1107-ZzbMath1397.91120OpenAlexW2589558386MaRDI QIDQ1649089

Takehito Masuda, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Takafumi Yamakawa

Publication date: 5 July 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1107-z

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmaexperimental studyperfect Nash equilibriumVarian's compensation mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (3)

Does the approval mechanism induce the efficient extraction in common pool resource games? ⋮ An experiment on cooperation in a CPR game with a disapproval option ⋮ Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Design

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Properties of a measure of predictive success
• Choice overload, coordination and inequality: three hurdles to the effectiveness of the compensation mechanism?
• Endogenous transfers in the prisoner's dilemma game: an experimental test of cooperation and coordination
• Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Cooperation without reputation: Experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games
• Prisoners' other dilemma
• The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
• An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
• Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma

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