Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts

DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1108-6zbMath1397.91476OpenAlexW2789577293MaRDI QIDQ1649091

Eliana Pepa Risma, Beatriz Millán

Publication date: 5 July 2018

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1108-6

zbMATH Keywords

contractsdecentralized marketrandom pathmany-to-many matching model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Paths to stable allocations

Cites Work

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