Common belief in approximate rationality

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.10.001zbMath1396.91037OpenAlexW2765125009MaRDI QIDQ1650264

Andrés Perea, Elias Tsakas, Angie Mounir

Publication date: 3 July 2018

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.10.001

zbMATH Keywords

rationalitynormal form gamescommon belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules

Cites Work

• Utility proportional beliefs
• When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• A bounded-rationality approach to the study of noncooperative games
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Topology-free typology of beliefs
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship

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