Mutually best matches

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.11.003zbMath1396.91575OpenAlexW2419418623MaRDI QIDQ1650271

Mikko A. A. Salonen, Hannu Salonen

Publication date: 3 July 2018

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.11.003

zbMATH Keywords

college admissions problemsiterative formationmutual matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
• On the existence of stable roommate matchings
• On cores and indivisibility
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Mutually best matches