Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.07.001zbMath1396.91271OpenAlexW2743288535MaRDI QIDQ1650272

Yizhaq Minchuk, Aner Sela

Publication date: 3 July 2018

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

first-price auctionshead startprebidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Favouritism and corruption in procurement auctions

Cites Work

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