Does two-part tariff licensing agreement enhance both welfare and profit?

DOI10.1007/s00712-014-0421-5zbMath1402.91238OpenAlexW2090088386MaRDI QIDQ1650936

Arijit Mukherjee, Yingyi Tsai

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-014-0421-5

zbMATH Keywords

welfarelicensingcost of technology transferquality of technology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Welfare economics (91B15)

Related Items (5)

Domestic patenting systems and foreign licensing choices ⋮ Optimal know-how transfers in licensing contracts ⋮ Profit-sharing licensing ⋮ The welfare effect of bargaining power in the licensing of a cost-reducing technology ⋮ Welfare reducing vertical licensing in the presence of complementary inputs

Cites Work

• Technology licensing under optimal tax policy
• On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
• KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION

This page was built for publication: Does two-part tariff licensing agreement enhance both welfare and profit?