A pre-emption model of mergers

DOI10.1007/S00712-013-0379-8zbMath1402.91170OpenAlexW2148095225MaRDI QIDQ1650991

Baomin Dong, Frank Yong Wang

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0379-8

zbMATH Keywords

pre-emptionoverpayingvalue destroying M\&As

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal number of firms
• Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
• Strategic merger waves: A theory of musical chairs
• Estimating merging costs by merger preconditions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Information and Efficiency in Tender Offers
• Comparative Statics for Oligopoly

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