An attorney fee as a signal in pretrial negotiation

DOI10.1007/S00712-014-0395-3zbMath1402.91123OpenAlexW2027552406MaRDI QIDQ1650999

Jeong-Yoo Kim

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-014-0395-3

zbMATH Keywords

signalattorney feepretrial negotiationsettlement demand

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Attorney fees in repeated relationships

Cites Work

• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

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