Decentralized union-oligopoly bargaining when wages signal strength

DOI10.1007/S00712-014-0401-9zbMath1402.91169OpenAlexW1993033809MaRDI QIDQ1651027

Wei Ding

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-014-0401-9

zbMATH Keywords

signalingincomplete informationlabor unionswage-bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing
• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The Bargaining Problem
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem

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