Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy

DOI10.1007/S00712-013-0386-9zbMath1402.91228OpenAlexW2295330071MaRDI QIDQ1651039

Armel Jacques, Emilie Dargaud

Publication date: 16 July 2018

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-013-0386-9

zbMATH Keywords

collusionorganizational designantitrust policyM-formU-form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (2)

Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy ⋮ On the social (sub)optimality of divisionalization under product differentiation

Cites Work

• Task assignment and organizational form
• Managerial overload and organization design
• Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy
• On interdependent supergames: Multimarket contact, concavity, and collusion
• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• How to Organize Crime¹
• Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
• Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion

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