On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1651219
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.005zbMath1400.91161OpenAlexW2789598381WikidataQ130076020 ScholiaQ130076020MaRDI QIDQ1651219
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Haris Aziz, Markus Brill
Publication date: 12 July 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.005
Related Items (9)
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions ⋮ An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes ⋮ Finding and Recognizing Popular Coalition Structures ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Portioning using ordinal preferences: fairness and efficiency ⋮ Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Welfare maximization entices participation ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences: a comment
- Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions
- Dominance in SSB utility theory
- Axiomatization of a preference for most probable winner
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- Strategic behaviour and a notion of ex ante efficiency in a voting model
- Manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Nontransitive measurable utility
- The voters' paradox, spin, and the Borda count
- The bipartisan set of a tournament game
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- A theorem on symmetric two-player zero-sum games
- The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
- An alternative direct proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem
- A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem
- Random dictatorship domains
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
- An alternative proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship result
- Comparison functions and choice correspondences
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives
- Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences
- Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules
- The computational complexity of random serial dictatorship
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
- Finding Strategyproof Social Choice Functions via SAT Solving
- Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
- A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Probabilistic Social Choice Based on Simple Voting Comparisons
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Tournament games and positive tournaments
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving
- Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice
- On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
This page was built for publication: On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
