An axiomatization of plays in repeated games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.012zbMath1400.91053OpenAlexW2796444363WikidataQ130019816 ScholiaQ130019816MaRDI QIDQ1651220

Laurent Mathevet

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.012

zbMATH Keywords

complexitystabilityequilibrium selectionevolutionaxiomspattern miningconventions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Internally renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets: Limit behavior with low discounting
• Testing threats in repeated games
• The Bargaining Problem
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Beliefs in Repeated Games

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