Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.03.008zbMath1400.91104OpenAlexW2795347772WikidataQ130036707 ScholiaQ130036707MaRDI QIDQ1651222

Leonardo Boncinelli, Ennio Bilancini

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2158/1121288

zbMATH Keywords

analogical reasoningcostly acquisition of informationreverse separationsignaling without single crossing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Competing conventions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Cheap talk with coarse understanding

Cites Work

• Market signaling with grades
• Analogy-based expectation equilibrium
• Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
• Reputation with Analogical Reasoning*
• Cursed Equilibrium

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