The object allocation problem with random priorities

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.010zbMath1400.91259OpenAlexW2795953683WikidataQ130042450 ScholiaQ130042450MaRDI QIDQ1651226

Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date: 12 July 2018

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

claimwise stabilityconstrained probabilistic serial mechanismconstrained sd-efficiencyprobabilistic deferred acceptance mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints, The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks, Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism, Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts

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