Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment
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Publication:1651234
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.003zbMath1400.91235OpenAlexW3125112421MaRDI QIDQ1651234
Publication date: 12 July 2018
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.003
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
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Cites Work
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